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Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason 
Stephen Houlgate, University of Warwick 
 
1. Hegel on Kant’s Antinomies 
 
Hegel is profoundly critical of Kant’s account of the antinomies of pure reason and especially 
of what he regards as Kant’s “trivial” resolution of them (EL § 48 Remark). Yet at the same 
time Hegel emphasises the considerable significance of Kant’s account. “These Kantian 
antinomies”, he writes, “will always remain an important part of the critical philosophy”, 
since “they, more than anything else, brought about the downfall of previous metaphysics and 
can be regarded as a main transition into more recent philosophy” (in particular that of Hegel 
himself) (SL 190 / LS 198).
1
 How then, according to Hegel, did the antinomies help take us 
from pre-Kantian metaphysics to his own speculative philosophy?  
Such metaphysics (exemplified most clearly by the thought of Christian Wolff) 
sought, in Hegel’s view, to attribute predicates to objects of reason, such as the soul, the 
world and God, and it assumed in so doing that such predicates were mutually exclusive. It 
aimed to determine, therefore, whether the world is finite or infinite and whether the soul is 
simple or composite, and it did not consider the possibility that the object concerned could in 
fact be both. This metaphysics was, accordingly, a form of dogmatism because it assumed 
“that of two opposed assertions [ … ] one must be true, and the other false” (EL § 32).2  
 Through his examination of the antinomies, however, Kant deals a significant blow to 
such dogmatism, for he argues that in the case of the world no choice between two opposing 
assertions can be made but “each of the propositions must be affirmed with equal necessity” 
(EL § 48): the world must be understood to be finite and infinite, to be composed of 
indivisible units and to be infinitely divisible. Kant’s argument, in Hegel’s view, thus puts an 
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end to the simple “either / or” of pre-Kantian metaphysics, at least in the area of cosmology. 
Yet Kant also agrees with metaphysics that predicates such as “finite” and “infinite” are 
opposed to one another and cannot be reconciled. The claim that both have to be predicated 
of the world “with equal justification and equal necessity” thus in fact produces a 
“contradiction” (Widerspruch): we must judge the world to be both finite and infinite, yet 
these two determinations exclude one another completely (EL §128, Remark and Add.).  
In Kant’s view (as Hegel sees it), this contradiction between assertions or judgements 
is not accidental, but inevitably confronts pure reason when it seeks to determine the nature 
of the world: “Kant’s conception of the antinomies is that they are ‘not sophisms but 
contradictions which reason must necessarily come up against’ (a Kantian expression); and 
this is an important view” (SL 191 / LS 199).3 Kant’s argument also suggests, albeit only 
implicitly, that the predicates, or categories, employed by reason are in fact contradictory 
themselves (see EL § 48 Remark). This is precisely because they are mutually exclusive, yet 
prove to be inseparable (since both must be asserted of the world). For Hegel, it is above all 
this implicit suggestion that categories are themselves contradictory — and necessarily so — 
that raises reason “into the higher spirit of more recent philosophy” and so takes us forward 
from metaphysics to truly speculative philosophy (SL 46 / LS 28, trans. altered).  
The idea that categories are contradictory does not, however, form the immediate 
starting point of speculative philosophy itself: for, as I have argued elsewhere, such 
philosophy at the outset may not presuppose anything concrete about thought and its 
categories but must begin from sheer indeterminate being.
4
 Kant’s antinomies thus do not 
lead directly to speculative philosophy. By suggesting that the categories are contradictory, 
the antinomies challenge the idea that they are simply distinct from, or opposed to, one 
another, that they are one-sided, finite categories; indeed, Hegel claims, the antinomies 
“produce the conviction of the nullity [Nichtigkeit] of the categories of finitude” (SL 190 / LS 
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198). This does not, however, itself require us to suspend all assumptions about the 
categories; yet it does help to prompt the philosopher, who is otherwise committed to free 
self-critical thought, to determine from scratch, without presuppositions, how the categories 
are to be understood. The antinomies, as Hegel conceives them, thus do not themselves make 
presuppositionless philosophy necessary, but they contribute indirectly to the emergence of 
such philosophy.
5
   
Hegel concedes that, for Kant, categories or “thought-determinations” are not 
contradictory in themselves, but contradictions arise only when reason applies them in 
judgements to the “unconditioned” or “things in themselves” (or, more precisely, to the world 
considered as something “in itself”).6 (Like the metaphysicians he criticises, Kant continues 
to think of categories themselves as one-sided and finite.)
7
 Nonetheless, Hegel contends, 
Kant’s account of the antinomies implicitly suggests that categories are contradictory, and 
that they are such necessarily: the “general idea” underlying that account, Hegel writes, is 
that of the “necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought 
determinations” (SL 56 / LS 41).8 Indeed, he calls this idea “the great negative step towards 
the true concept of reason” (SL 46 / LS 29).9  
 This step is merely negative, for Hegel, because it negates the simple distinctions and 
oppositions between categories and points to their contradictory character, but does no more 
than this: it does not take us on to what Hegel thinks is the logical conclusion of that very 
step, namely the insight that opposed categories actually form a unity. This insight is, 
however, reached in the course of speculative philosophy, initially and in particular in 
speculative logic. Such logic begins from the presuppositionless, indeterminate thought of 
pure being; but categories then emerge that are more or less explicitly contradictory or 
“antinomial”, insofar as each is both itself and its negation, and in this way the insight that for 
Hegel is implicit in Kant’s antinomies is confirmed. We also discover, however, that 
4 
 
categories are not merely contradictory, but prove to be more or less explicit unities of 
opposed determinations (see EL §§ 81–2). In the sphere of quality, for example, the infinite 
proves not just to be a contradictory finite-infinite, but to be the perfect fusion of finitude and 
true infinity: the truly infinite process of its finite moments (see SL 148 / LS 148–9).10  
Speculative logic does not stop at contradiction and antinomy, therefore, but shows how 
categories resolve the very contradictions they contain (by mutating either into further 
versions of themselves or into different categories).  
Now, in Hegel’s view, Kant also “resolves” his antinomies to his own satisfaction. He 
does so, however, not by watching them resolve themselves into a unity of opposed 
determinations but by declaring them to be merely “subjective” (SL 191 / LS 200).11 For 
Hegel’s Kant, the contradictions revealed by the antinomies are genuine and necessary, but 
the world that exhibits such contradictions is in truth not something that exists in itself: it is 
merely the world of our subjective experience, that is, “the world of appearance” (die 
erscheinende Welt) (EL § 48 Remark, trans. altered). Whatever there may be in itself is thus, 
for Kant, free of contradiction, and the latter belongs only to the world that is there for us. To 
Hegel, however, this “resolution” is inadequate, for it leaves the antinomies themselves 
“unresolved” (unaufgelöst). In the eyes of Kantian reason, Hegel claims, the contradictions 
remain, even though the world they beset is declared to be subjective rather than objective 
(SL 191 / LS 200).  
Note that there is actually an inconsistency in the position Hegel attributes to Kant: 
for Hegel’s Kant, contradictions arise only because opposing categories “are applied by 
reason to things in themselves” (SL 56 / LS 41), that is, to the world considered as thing in 
itself; yet they remain even when the world is revealed not to be a thing in itself but mere 
appearance. (As we will see below, Hegel also gets Kant wrong at this point, since Kant 
himself does not consider appearances to be contradictory.) Yet Hegel fails to notice the 
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inconsistency, so it makes no difference to his assessment of Kant’s “resolution” of the 
antinomies. The latter, in Hegel’s view, is inadequate because Kant argues that “the worldly 
content, whose determinations are caught in such a contradiction, cannot be something in 
itself, but only appearance [Erscheinung]” (EL § 48, trans. altered), but he thereby leaves our 
own “subjective” reason and experience entangled in contradiction and, Hegel would add, 
contradictory categories. In the Logic, by contrast, Hegel provides what he considers to be a 
more profound resolution of the antinomies. He does so by showing that the categories that 
(in his view) underlie those antinomies are not merely contradictory after all, either for our 
reason or in being itself, but “have their truth only in their sublatedness [Aufgehobensein], 
only in the unity of their concept” (SL 192 / LS 200, trans. altered).  
The idea that Hegel’s speculative logic proceeds by “resolving contradictions” is, of 
course, a simplification of what actually goes on, which is more complex and subtle.
12
 
Nonetheless, it is true that being and nothing are at odds in becoming but united in Dasein 
and that the contradictions of finitude are resolved in true infinity. So Hegel’s simplified 
description of what occurs in speculative logic is not wrong. The principal difference between 
Hegel and Hegel’s Kant is thus, indeed, that the former resolves contradictions in categories 
that the latter leaves unresolved.  
A further difference between them is that Hegel’s Kant fails to see, as Hegel does, 
that all antinomies, properly understood, are actually generated by categories. I noted above 
that Hegel’s Kant, unlike Hegel himself, does not consider categories as such to be 
contradictory, but locates the source of contradiction in the application of those categories to 
the world (regarded as a thing in itself). This in turn means that he does not understand the 
categories themselves to be the true source of antinomies, and so does not appreciate the real 
significance of what he has disclosed. For Hegel’s Kant, antinomies are conflicts between 
metaphysical judgements about the world (in which categories are applied to an object of 
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reason), but they are not conflicts between, and do not highlight the contradictory character 
of, one-sided categories as such. As Hegel puts it, therefore, “Kant did not take up the 
antinomy in the concepts themselves, but in the already concrete form of cosmological 
determinations” (SL 191 / LS 199). In Hegel’s own view, by contrast, what is expressed and 
demonstrated by Kant’s antinomies — albeit implicitly — is that “the categories on their own 
account [für sich] are what produce the contradiction” (EL § 48 Remark, trans. altered).13 
Thus, in order to study the antinomies of reason properly, we must focus directly on the 
categories, without Kant’s (for Hegel) extraneous cosmological baggage. In Hegel’s words: 
 
in order to possess the antinomy in its purity and to deal with it in its simple 
concept, the determinations of thought must not be taken in their application to 
and entanglement in the general idea of the world, of space, time, matter, etc.; this 
concrete material must be omitted from consideration of these determinations 
which it is powerless to influence and which must be considered purely on their 
own account, since they alone constitute the essence and ground of the 
antinomies (SL 191 / LS 199).
14
  
  
This, of course, is what Hegel does in his “science of logic”. That logic can thus be regarded 
as Hegel’s revised and purified version of Kant’s important but deficient study of the 
antinomies of reason (just as it can also be regarded as a revised and purified version of 
Kant’s question-begging derivation, or “metaphysical deduction”, of the categories).15  
 Since Hegel’s Kant fails to identify the categories as the source of the antinomies of 
reason, he also fails to see that there are far more than just four such antinomies. Indeed, he 
fails to see that “profounder insight into the antinomial, or more truly into the dialectical 
nature of reason demonstrates any concept whatever” — that is, any pure concept or category 
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— “to be a unity of opposed moments to which, therefore, the form of antinomial assertions 
could be given” (SL 191 / LS 199).16 In this respect, Hegel claims, Kant lags behind ancient 
Greek scepticism, which “did not spare itself the pains of demonstrating this contradiction or 
antinomy in every concept which confronted it in the sciences” (SL 191 / LS 199). Yet 
Kant’s contribution is still the more important one for speculative philosophy — indeed, is 
“one of the most important and profound advances of the philosophy of modern times” (EL § 
48) — because he argues not just that antinomies can be found (or generated) by thought 
contingently, but that they belong to reason of necessity. This Kantian insistence that the 
production of antinomies — or “dialectic” — is “a necessary activity of reason” (SL 56 / LS 
41, trans. altered) is so important, in Hegel’s view, because it in turn makes it necessary for 
post-Kantian philosophy to reconsider the way the understanding conceives of the categories 
(though, as I noted above, it does not itself make a strictly presuppositionless study of the 
categories necessary). This is not to deny that Hegel’s philosophy owes a debt to Greek 
scepticism (and to Greek dialectic in, for example, Zeno and Plato); but, in Hegel’s eyes, it is 
indebted more profoundly to Kant’s philosophy.17 For Hegel, Kant’s emphasis on the 
necessity of the antinomies, and by implication on the necessarily contradictory character of 
categories, makes it essential that we reconsider how the latter have traditionally been 
conceived; and his commitment to rational self-critique and freedom requires such 
reconsideration to take nothing for granted about thought (or being) and to be radically 
presuppositionless.
18
  
 Having said all this, it is hard to deny that Hegel’s understanding of Kant’s 
antinomies is, from a Kantian point of view, idiosyncratic. By Hegel’s own admission, he 
sets to one side what principally interests Kant about them and focuses on a claim that Kant 
himself does not explicitly make, namely that categories produce the antinomies and thereby 
prove to be contradictory themselves; indeed, Hegel even says that such a claim goes “against 
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[gegen] Kant’s intention” (VGP 356).19 Moreover, what Hegel means by “category” does not 
coincide exactly with what Kant means. Kant understands a category to be a pure concept 
through which “the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition” is thought (CPR B 105); this 
is to be distinguished not only from an empirical concept, but also from other pure concepts, 
including concepts of reflection and transcendental Ideas (see CPR B 316ff, B 378ff). By 
contrast, Hegel uses the term “category” in a broad sense to refer to all pure concepts and 
does not restrict any of them to mere representations of the unity of intuition: all categories, 
for him, are logical structures in their own right that at the same time bring fundamental ways 
of being to mind.
20
 By implicitly suggesting that categories are themselves contradictory, 
Hegel’s Kant thus implicitly suggests to Hegel himself that contradiction belongs to being as 
such — a suggestion that, as Hegel well knows, Kant himself would emphatically reject.21 
Kantians can be forgiven, therefore, for thinking that Hegel does not provide an interpretation 
of Kant’s antinomies at all, but simply reads into them what he is interested in finding there. 
There are, I think, good grounds for claiming that Kant should have been interested in what 
interests Hegel about the antinomies, since, as I have argued elsewhere, Hegel’s whole 
philosophy is the logical outcome of taking Kant’s own project of rational self-criticism more 
seriously than Kant did.
22
 Nonetheless, it seems clear that Hegel does not do justice to Kant’s 
antinomies in a way that Kant himself would have recognised, and that the Kant whose 
antinomies Hegel finds so fruitful is, in the words of Martial Gueroult, an “hegelianised 
Kant”.23    
 Yet things are in fact a little more complicated than this, for, as I will argue later, 
Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s antinomies is by no means wholly unjustified. Furthermore, 
Hegel sheds important light on Kant’s actual arguments or “proofs” in the antinomies (as 
opposed to what Kant should be arguing or suggests merely implicitly).  
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In Hegel’s view, Kant implicitly shows categories, such as “finite” and “infinite”, to be 
contradictory by showing them to be bound to one another, even though they are opposed; 
and he shows them to be bound to one another by arguing that both must be predicated of the 
same world by reason. As we have seen, Hegel applauds this implication of Kant’s 
arguments. At the same time, however, he dismisses Kant’s manner of argument itself as a 
“useless form” (unnütze Form) (SL 191 / LS 199). Kant’s arguments or “proofs” are 
“useless”, in Hegel’s view, because they serve no real purpose, and they serve no purpose 
because they simply presuppose what they are meant to prove. For Hegel, Kant’s arguments 
in the antinomies, which purport to prove that the world is both finite and infinite, are really 
no more than assertions masquerading as arguments: 
 
the Kantian antinomies on closer inspection contain nothing more than the quite 
simple categorical assertion of each of the two opposed moments of a 
determination, each being taken on its own in isolation from the other. But at the 
same time this simple categorical, or strictly speaking assertoric statement is 
wrapped up in a false, twisted scaffolding of reasoning which is intended to 
produce a semblance of proof and to conceal and disguise the merely assertoric 
character of the statement (SL 192 / LS 200).    
 
The second antinomy, for example, consists merely in the assertion of the two moments of 
quantity — discreteness and continuity — against one another: “the one-sided assertion of 
discreteness gives infinite or absolute dividedness [Geteiltsein]”, whereas “the one-sided 
assertion of continuity, on the other hand, gives infinite divisibility [Teilbarkeit]” (SL 190 / 
LS 198). The world is thus asserted to be absolutely finite in the first case, since division 
reaches its limit in simple discrete parts, and absolutely infinite in the second case, since 
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division continues without end.
24
 (Hegel is well aware, by the way, that Kant actually 
opposes “composition” (Zusammensetzung), rather than “continuity”, to simplicity and 
discreteness in the second antinomy, but he insists that this does not itself generate an 
antinomy, since it is a tautology that “the composite consists of the simple” (SL 192 / LS 
201). On the other hand, Hegel maintains, by asserting in the proof of the antithesis that 
“composition is possible only in space”, which for both Kant and Hegel is continuous, Kant 
implicitly pits continuity against simplicity in the antinomy (SL 195 / LS 205).)
25
   
Kant himself contends that the arguments in support of the thesis and antithesis in each 
antinomy are “sophistical” (vernünftelnd), insofar as they rest on an illegitimate assumption. 
This assumption is that appearances are things in themselves and so form a world that is 
independent of us (but also given to us) and that can be limited or unlimited, composed of 
indivisible units or endlessly divisible, and so on (CPR B 397–8, 535). Yet Kant also insists 
that, aside from this assumption, the “proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not semblances 
[Blendwerke] but well grounded” (CPR B 535): they are properly formed arguments that are 
“without contradiction” and are supported by “valid and necessary grounds” (CPR B 449).26 
Indeed, in the Prolegomena Kant states unequivocally that “I will vouch for the correctness 
of all these proofs” (P § 52a). Thus, on the (illegitimate) assumption that empirical objects 
form an independent world “in itself”, the arguments in each antinomy succeed, in Kant’s 
view, in proving that both the thesis and the antithesis are true of that world.  
In Hegel’s view, by contrast, such arguments are mere “pseudoproofs” 
(Scheinbeweise), quite apart from the assumption that Kant claims they make. This is because 
they presuppose the very thesis and antithesis that they are to prove (and the categories 
contained therein): “what is supposed to be proved is always already contained in the 
presuppositions that form the starting point, and the semblance of a mediation is produced 
only through Kant’s prolix, apagogic procedure” (EL § 48 Add.). This can be seen, for 
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example, in Kant’s proof of the thesis in the second antinomy. The thesis states that “every 
composite substance in the world consists of simple parts”; but the proof depends on the 
claim that “with substances composition is only a contingent relation, apart from which, as 
beings persisting by themselves, they must subsist”, which is itself just a restatement of the 
thesis (CPR 462–4, emphasis added; see also SL 193–4 / LS 202–3). Indeed, as Michelle 
Grier puts it, Kant’s proof actually “exploits a purely conceptual necessity”, namely, that the 
very “concept of a composite” — and not just that of a “composite substance” — “commits 
us to the concept of the simple, which externally relates to comprise it”.27 Grier fails to note, 
however, that this makes a mockery of Kant’s claim to have proven the thesis 
“apagogically”.28  
Hegel’s charge, therefore, is not (as Kant’s is) that the proofs of the thesis and antithesis 
in each antinomy rest on an unwarranted assumption about appearances, but rather that these 
proofs are altogether circular. This problem cannot just be blamed on the proponents of the 
two positions, for Kant himself sets out the proofs and, indeed, regards them as correct (given 
the illegitimate assumption on which they rest). The problem, as Hegel sees it, is thus, in 
Sally Sedgwick’s words, that “Kant’s treatment of the antinomies is question-begging”.29 
This strikes me, as it strikes Sedgwick, as a serious and well founded charge.  
 
2. Kant on the Antinomies in general 
 
If, however, we are properly to assess the merits of Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s 
antinomies, we need to look in more detail at Kant’s own account of the latter. We will thus 
now consider how in general, for Kant, an antinomy or contradiction in reason is generated. 
First, Kant argues, reason concludes — or, more precisely, leads the understanding to 
judge
30
 — that the totality of conditions of appearance, that is, the world, is given as a reality 
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in itself. This conclusion is reached by the following argument that Kant regards as 
“dialectical”: if the conditioned is given, then the whole series of all conditions for it is also 
given; now objects of the senses are given as conditioned; consequently, the whole series of 
conditions of the objects of the senses is, and must be, given as a world that is a thing in itself 
(CPR B 525).
31
 This argument is dialectical (in Kant’s sense) for two principal reasons. First, 
it assumes erroneously that objects of the senses can, indeed, be given as a totality, whereas 
in fact, as “appearances”, they can be given only through a regressive synthesis that can never 
be completed. Second, it assumes, again erroneously, that the objects of the senses, as 
appearances, are also things in themselves (the assumption of transcendental realism).
32
 The 
conclusion that the world is given as a reality in itself is thus reached by a dialectical 
argument that fails to respect the limits, in particular to the concept of an “appearance”, laid 
down by transcendental idealism.  
After having convinced itself (or the understanding) that the totality of the conditions of 
appearances exists as a world in itself, reason then discerns an ambiguity in the very idea of 
such a totality. So what exactly is this ambiguity? The answer becomes clear if we consider 
the difference between the ideas of the soul and God and the idea of the world (see B 379). 
Each of the former is the idea of a single unconditioned condition: the unconditioned 
condition of thought as such in the case of the soul, and of all possible objects of thought, or 
of things as such, in the case of God (see CPR A 397, B 391). God, or the transcendental 
ideal, contains the totality of conditions of things, insofar as he, or it, encompasses “the entire 
storehouse of material from which all possible predicates of things can be taken” (CPR B 
603). Nonetheless, God is, or rather is assumed to be, the single “being of all beings” that 
grounds all things (CPR B 607). The idea of the world, by contrast, is not that of a single 
unconditioned condition, but rather that of an explicit totality of conditions conceived as a 
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series. More precisely, it is the thought of the complete series of conditions of appearances 
(see CPR B 532).  
Kant maintains that a “totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned” (B 379). He 
also points out, however, that the complete series of conditions of appearances can in fact be 
conceived as unconditioned, or as entailing the unconditioned, in two distinct ways. This is an 
ambiguity inherent in the idea of the world, but absent from the ideas of the soul and God. On 
the one hand, Kant contends, that series as a whole can itself be considered to be 
unconditioned, “because outside it there are no more conditions regarding which it could be 
conditioned” (CPR B 445n). On the other hand, however, the series can be understood to 
have the unconditioned as its first member (for example, as the first part or the cause of the 
series) (see CPR B 445). In the first case, in which there is no unconditioned first member, 
the series will be infinite and “without limits”; accordingly, reason will never be able to 
complete its regress through the conditions, even though the series itself is given as a whole. 
In the second case, by contrast, the series will have an endpoint or limit and so be finite (see 
CPR B 445–6). That limit will be the limit of space and time, or the point at which division 
ends, or the unconditioned (free) cause of events, depending on the antinomy concerned.
33
  
Kant goes on to argue that the complete series of conditions of appearances not only 
can but must be understood in these two opposing ways. When the thought of this necessity is 
then combined with the assumption that the complete series actually exists as something in 
itself, the antinomies are generated. This is because thought must now attribute two mutually 
exclusive features to one reality, but that reality, as such, must be determinate and so have 
one or the other of them (but not both). Note that, for Kant, a genuine antinomy or 
contradiction is not produced by the mere thought that the world is, or must be, ambiguous in 
the way I have described. It arises only when we take that ambiguous world to be a reality in 
itself that by its nature must be unambiguous. Antinomies arise, therefore, only because we 
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combine conflicting judgements about the “world” with the erroneous conclusion of the 
dialectical argument set out above, which is itself based on the error of transcendental 
realism. As Kant puts it, “if one regards the two propositions, ‘The world is infinite in 
magnitude’, ‘The world is finite in magnitude’, as contradictory opposites, then one assumes 
that the world (the whole series of appearances) is a thing in itself” (CPR B 532). 
Since the erroneous judgement that appearances are things in themselves is, in Kant’s 
view, quite “natural” (CPR B 528), the antinomy to which that judgement leads is itself “a 
wholly natural antithetic” (CPR B 433). The very fact that an antinomy or contradiction 
arises, however, shows that the judgement on which it rests is, indeed, erroneous: the 
antinomy “uncovers a falsehood lying in this presupposition” of transcendental realism (CPR 
B 535). This in turn, Kant maintains, provides an indirect proof of transcendental idealism — 
the thesis that “everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience 
possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations”, not things existing 
independently in themselves (CPR B 518–19; see also CPR B 534). Kant’s direct proof of 
such idealism is presented in the first part of the Critique, the Transcendental Aesthetic, and 
it is against the background of this proof that he initially rejects transcendental realism as an 
error: for the latter falsely turns appearances or mere representations into things in 
themselves. The fact that transcendental realism generates antinomies, however, confirms 
that it is an error, and so indirectly confirms the truth of transcendental idealism.
34
 
For Kant, reality as it is thought to be in itself cannot be contradictory or antinomial, 
but must be unambiguously itself; indeed, “no predicate pertains to a thing that contradicts 
it”, whether the thing is a thing in itself or an appearance (CPR B 190). Yet, when the world 
— the complete series of conditions of empirical objects — is judged to be a reality in itself, 
it proves precisely to be contradictory. Since the arguments proving it to be so are sound, 
given the assumption that such a world exists, the conclusion we must draw is that that 
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assumption must be wrong and the world cannot be anything real in itself after all. It must, 
rather, be an “idea” that merely seems to have a real existence of its own. The fundamental 
forms of that world, namely space and time, cannot have a real existence of their own, either, 
but must be merely subjective (albeit for us universal): the a priori forms of our human 
sensibility. In this way, transcendental idealism is proven indirectly by the antinomy 
generated by transcendental realism.
35
 
Kant, however, does not justify the claim that reality in itself cannot contain a 
contradiction; he takes it over, uncritically, from traditional formal logic. (It is, of course, 
immediately derived from the “principle of contradiction”, which is regarded by Kant as the 
“general though to be sure only negative condition of all our judgments whatsoever” (CPR B 
190).) For Kant, it is simply obvious that no reality can be contradictory; where contradiction 
is found, therefore, there can be no reality. This, I take it, is why Hegel accuses Kant of 
showing too great a “tenderness” (Zärtlichkeit) towards things (EL § 48 Remark).36 In 
Hegel’s view, Kant deserves (qualified) credit for maintaining that reason generates 
antinomies, but he deserves censure for insisting, without clear justification, that reality as it 
is thought to be, and as it is judged actually to be, in itself must be free of all contradiction.
37
  
As we have seen, there is a necessary tension in the very idea of a complete series of 
conditions of appearances, since it can, and must, be conceived both as unconditioned itself 
(and so unlimited and infinite) and as containing an unconditioned first member (and so 
limited and finite). A strict antinomy or contradiction arises, however, only when that 
complete series is taken actually to be something real in itself, that is, when we commit the 
error of transcendental realism: for only in that case are we required to attribute two mutually 
exclusive characteristics to a reality that must be one or the other. If, therefore, we abandon 
the idea that this complete series constitutes something real in itself, in favour of 
transcendental idealism, then the antinomies of pure reason are immediately “removed” 
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(gehoben) (CPR B 534): if the reality that proves contradictory is eliminated, then the 
contradiction it produces itself disappears. Accordingly, for the critical or transcendental 
idealist, there is “no real contradiction of reason” (CPR B 768), because there is no 
determinate totality of appearances, or “world in itself”, about which two mutually exclusive 
judgements must be made: such a world is a mere “mirage” (Blendwerk) (CPR B 451). The 
thesis and antithesis of each antinomy remain opposed to one another, but they are not 
actually about anything and so produce no contradiction.
38
  
It is important to emphasise here that, in Kant’s view, not every pair of conflicting 
assertions about a thing or things produces a contradiction. If, for example, we assert that 
every body smells good and also that every body smells bad, there is not necessarily a 
contradiction, since both propositions could be false: there could, after all, be bodies that do 
not smell at all (see CPR B 531). A contradiction in Kant’s sense arises only when two 
assertions are made about something, and are assumed to be true of it, one of which, 
however, must be false while the other is true. So if we assert both that every body smells 
good and that not every body smells good (partly because some do not smell at all), we have 
a direct contradiction, because one assertion must be true and thereby excludes the other.  
Similarly, conflicting claims about the world as a whole produce a contradiction, when 
both prove to be necessary but one must be true and the other false. Take, for example, the 
thesis and antithesis of the first antinomy (without their specific reference to space and time). 
The thesis states that the world is finite in magnitude, whereas the antithesis states that it is 
infinite. They produce a contradiction, however, only under the condition that “the world (the 
whole series of appearances) is a thing in itself” — an actually existing thing in itself — and 
so must be “determined in itself regarding its magnitude”: for this condition requires that it 
have a magnitude that is either finite or infinite (but that cannot be both) (CPR B 532–3). If, 
therefore, we remove this condition by denying that the world exists as a thing in itself, the 
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contradiction automatically disappears. It does so, because the thesis and antithesis both 
prove to be false: the world is neither finite nor infinite in itself, since there is no world “in 
itself” at all.39 The conflict in each antinomy is thus in truth not a contradiction but a 
“dialectical” conflict — one that merely seems to be a contradiction — because the world that 
is its subject is itself an illusion. As Kant writes, it is simply “a conflict of an illusion” (or 
“due to” an illusion) (ein Widerstreit eines Scheins) (CPR B 534).  
Yet things are in fact more complicated than Kant recognizes: for the conflict that is 
generated by the illusory world cannot just be seemingly contradictory. A contradiction is 
initially produced because the “world” is necessarily ambiguous but is also judged to be 
something real in itself and therefore unambiguous. This contradiction is then “removed” 
when the world is shown not to be real in itself after all, but to be merely illusory. The world, 
however, retains the same characteristics when it is reduced to mere illusion, as it had when it 
was judged to be real in itself: it must still be understood to be both finite and infinite, and to 
have a determinate character of its own that is unambiguously finite or infinite. This means 
that this illusory world must itself give rise to an actual contradiction. There is no 
contradiction in the world in itself, since there is no such world and the thesis and antithesis 
of an antinomy are both false insofar as they are taken to apply to such a world. Yet there is 
still a contradiction in the world there seems to be, since the thesis and antithesis still apply 
necessarily to that world, but the latter cannot be characterised by both of them. When the 
world is exposed as an illusion, therefore, the conflict between the thesis and antithesis does 
not just prove to be seemingly contradictory (and so dialectical); it remains a genuine 
contradiction besetting the world there merely seems to be. Kant does not make this point 
explicit himself — indeed, he insists that “the conflict of reason with itself” can be brought 
“entirely to an end” (CPR B 544) — but the point is implicit in what he says.  
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The judgements that the world has a beginning in time and does not have such a 
beginning thus have an ambiguous status. On the one hand, insofar as the world to which they 
apply is not something real in itself, those judgements merely seem to be true: they are 
illusory judgements. This in turn means that the transcendental illusion that Kant declares to 
be unavoidable includes not only the ideas and the principle Grier calls “P2” — namely, 
“when the conditioned is given, then so is the whole series of conditions subordinated one to 
the other, which is itself unconditioned, also given” (CPR B 364)40 — but also the theses and 
antitheses of the four antinomies: it includes “e.g. the illusion in the proposition ‘the world 
must have a beginning in time’” (CPR B 353). On the other hand, however, such judgements 
do not merely seem to be true of the world that merely seems to be real, but they are indeed 
true of it. The world as a whole is not real in itself but merely seems to be, but it remains no 
less true that it must be understood to be both finite and infinite even though it must also be 
determinate and so either finite or infinite. 
Kant’s claim that there is “no real contradiction of reason with itself” (CPR B 768) thus 
needs to be qualified. There is no actual contradiction, since no complete world to which 
mutually exclusive predicates necessarily apply is actually given. Yet there is still a “real 
contradiction of reason”, since such mutually exclusive predicates continue to apply to the 
determinate world that seems to be given. This contradiction is no mere illusion, but is a 
necessary and irreducible feature of the world that seems, and must seem, to exist: it is the 
“conflict of an illusion” that remains contradictory (CPR B 534, trans. altered). Kantian 
reason — that is, reason enlightened by transcendental idealism — does not confront a 
contradictory reality “in itself”, but it will always face the contradictions generated by the 
illusions that it necessarily projects, that is, by its own “subjective” products. In this sense, 
Hegel is right to claim that Kant’s solution to the antinomies “make[s] the so-called conflict 
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[Widerstreit] into something subjective, in which of course it remains still the same illusion, 
that is, as unresolved, as before” (SL 191 / LS 200, emphasis added). 
It has to be admitted, however, that in these lines Hegel does not himself have in mind 
the point I have just been making. He is not claiming that, for Kant, contradiction, though 
absent from the sphere of the “in itself”, continues to belong to the world that seems to be real 
in itself, that is, to transcendental illusion (Schein). His claim is rather that Kant shifts 
contradiction from things in themselves to the (in Hegel’s view) “subjective” realm of 
appearance (Erscheinung). It is for this reason that Hegel thinks Kant does not ultimately 
resolve his antinomies: for Hegel’s Kant, contradiction remains even in the world of our 
empirical experience, the world as it is for us. 
That this is Hegel’s view is confirmed by his statement in the Encyclopaedia that, for 
Kant, “the worldly content, whose determinations are caught in such a contradiction, cannot 
be something in itself, but only appearance [Erscheinung]”, and by the subsequent remark 
that “it is not considered at all objectionable that the world of appearance [die erscheinende 
Welt] shows contradictions to the spirit that observes it” (EL § 48 and Remark, trans. altered). 
The interpretation of Kant expressed in these lines is, however, clearly mistaken: for, in 
Kant’s own view, there is no contradiction in mere appearances. The illusion projected by 
reason’s idea of the world may well continue to produce contradictions (even if Kant does not 
say as much himself); but there is no contradiction in things as they actually appear to us, in 
the things we experience.  
For Kant, a contradiction arises when the totality of conditions of appearance is 
assumed to be something real in itself, because that one totality must be understood (for 
example) both to have and not to have a limit in space and time. Kant then dissolves this 
contradiction by rejecting the assumption on which it rests: in his view, appearances do not 
constitute a reality or world “in itself” and so are neither infinite nor finite “in themselves”; 
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there is thus no contradiction in them (see CPR B 533).
41
 One might still worry, however, 
that, even if they have no existence in themselves, appearances form a given whole for us and 
that that whole must be both infinite and finite. If that were the case, then the contradiction 
attached to reason would not actually be removed but would simply be relocated from the 
world “in itself” (which has now been exposed as an illusion) to the world of our appearances 
(which is empirically real), and Hegel would be right.  
Kant insists, however, that appearances (and their conditions) not only do not constitute 
a whole reality or world in itself but also do not constitute a whole world or totality for us. 
Appearances (and their conditions) are not given as a totality at all, because (as I have noted 
above) they are given only in the “regressive series of my representations” and that series can 
never be completed (CPR B 533; see also B 527). As I regress back from what is actually 
given to me to other objects of perception, I regress from one conditioned thing to another, 
but I never reach a point at which no further regression is possible and the whole can thus be 
said to be given. Accordingly, the series of appearances “is never wholly given, and the world 
is thus not an unconditioned whole, and thus does not exist as such a whole, either with 
infinite or finite magnitude” (CPR B 533). There can be no contradiction in appearances, 
therefore, because they do not constitute a totality to which mutually exclusive predicates 
must, or could even, be applied.   
Hegel thus misunderstands Kant when he claims that Kant just shifts contradiction from 
things in themselves into the realm of appearances and thereby leaves such contradiction 
“unresolved”. For Kant, there is no fundamental contradiction in the realm of appearance 
because that realm does not, and cannot, constitute a given totality to which conflicting 
predicates must apply. Nonetheless, as I suggested above, there is truth in Hegel’s claim that 
Kant leaves the contradiction set out in the Antinomies unresolved: for that contradiction 
remains an ineliminable feature of the worldly totality there merely seems to be.  
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3. Hegel on Kant’s Antinomies once again 
 
From Hegel’s perspective, Kant also falls short insofar as he does not provide the resolution 
of the antinomies that Hegel thinks is required: Kant fails to focus on the categories that (in 
Hegel’s view) give rise to the antinomies when they are understood in a one-sided manner, 
and he fails to think such one-sided categories in their true, “speculative”, unity with one 
another. As I have noted above, what interests Hegel about Kant’s antinomies is not 
principally Kant’s own story about the ideas, transcendental illusion and transcendental 
realism, but rather what they suggest about the categories of thought, and about the categories 
in Hegel’s sense rather than Kant’s.  
In Kant’s own view, the antinomies are indeed related to categories, since they are 
generated by combining the idea of the world with transcendental realism and all ideas of 
reason in turn are simply “categories extended to the unconditioned” (CPR B 436; see also B 
383). More precisely, the ideas are reached by starting from a premise in which a category of 
relation is expressed and arguing back, through syllogistic inference, to the point at which the 
“synthetic unity” thought in that category is regarded as something unconditioned (and / or as 
encompassing a totality of conditions) (see CPR B 383).
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 The category of substance, for 
example, is the thought of “something that can exist only as subject and never as mere 
predicate”, so this is extended to the idea of the unconditioned subject (CPR B 289, 379). 
This unconditioned subject is then identified with the thinking subject (or “I”) to produce the 
specific idea of the “soul” (see CPR B 391).43 The category of causality, on the other hand, is 
based on the thought of the dependence of one thing on another (or the relation of ground and 
consequent) (B 106), so this is extended to the idea of the whole series of such dependencies 
(see CPR B 106, 379, 393). This totality is then identified with the series of conditions of 
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objects in space and time (that is, of “appearances”) to produce the idea of the “world” (see 
CPR B 391).
44
  
In Hegel’s view, however, Kant’s antinomies are just as intimately connected to what 
he (Hegel) considers to be the categories of infinity and finitude, and they implicitly suggest 
that these categories themselves are both opposed to and inseparable from one another and in 
that sense contradictory (see VPG 356). Indeed, for Hegel, Kant’s antinomies are in truth 
generated by these and other categories (see EL § 48 Remark).
45
 The proper consideration of 
the antinomies — which Kant fails to carry out — should thus focus on such categories 
“purely for themselves” (rein für sich) and show how they resolve their own contradictions 
logically and thereby develop into their unity (SL 191–2 / LS 199–200, trans. altered).  
Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s antinomies clearly disregards many of Kant’s own 
explicit concerns. In my view, however, it is not simply unjustified. The connection Hegel 
draws between Kant’s antinomies and certain (hegelian) categories finds its justification in 
Kant’s claim that the antinomies are generated (on the assumption of transcendental realism) 
by the two ways in which the totality of conditions of appearance can be understood to be 
unconditioned. As I noted above, that totality can be understood to be unconditioned as a 
whole and to have no unconditioned first member, in which case it is an infinite totality (in 
what Hegel would consider a “bad” sense); but the totality can also be understood to have an 
unconditioned first member and so to be limited and finite. Kant makes clear that this 
distinction, indeed opposition, between an infinite and finite series underlies all four 
antinomies (see CPR B 445–6). Furthermore, each antinomy purports to show that the world 
in itself must be both infinite and finite, even though the two are mutually exclusive. Thus, 
although Hegel interprets Kant’s antinomies “against Kant’s intention” (VGP 356), his claim 
that they are generated ultimately by categories is at least partly justified by Kant’s own 
procedure: for (assuming transcendental realism) Kant’s antinomies arise because “infinity” 
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and “finitude” prove to be both opposed and inseparable at the same time.46 It is true that for 
Kant (in Hegel’s words) “reason only falls into contradiction through the application of the 
categories” to the “world” (EL § 48 Remark). Yet it is the fact that categories such as infinity 
and finitude — or continuity and discreteness — are themselves conceived by Kant as 
essentially opposed to one another that actually generates the contradiction when both have to 
be “applied” to the world. In this sense, Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s antinomies is 
defensible.   
Hegel is also justified in claiming that Kant does not properly resolve the contradiction 
that he (Hegel) sees in Kant’s antinomies. As we know, Hegel thinks that the contradictions 
within and between categories, such as infinity and finitude, are resolved — or, rather, 
resolve themselves — in the course of speculative logic. This occurs as such categories prove 
to be moments of a unity (see SL 191–2 / LS 200). No aspect of Kant’s resolution of the 
antinomies, however, yields this conclusion, so none can satisfy Hegel. Kant resolves the 
antinomies to his own satisfaction by rejecting transcendental realism and so denying that 
appearances and their conditions form a reality in itself that could be either infinite or finite: 
there is no “real contradiction” between the thesis and antithesis of the antinomies because 
there is no one reality to which both must apply (see CPR B 768). From Hegel’s perspective, 
however, Kant fails thereby to resolve the contradiction between categories such as infinity 
and finitude in a properly speculative manner.  
This remains true even though Hegel is wrong to claim that Kant simply moves 
contradiction from the sphere of things in themselves to that of appearance. Viewed from a 
modified, “Hegelian” perspective (rather than Hegel’s own), Kant still fails to provide the 
resolution that Hegel seeks. He fails in two distinct ways.  
First, as we have seen, Kant rejects the assumption that the totality of conditions of 
appearance constitutes a reality in itself, but he accepts that it seems to do so. Furthermore, as 
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I argued above, that seeming reality must continue to be contradictory in Kant’s sense, even 
though Kant himself does not explicitly recognize this. Since the world there merely seems to 
be retains the same character as the world that is erroneously judged to exist, it must still be 
either finite or infinite, but must also still be judged to be both. This in turn means that for 
Hegel, the opposed categories of finitude and infinity must still both apply to Kant’s illusory 
“world”, and so be inseparable in their opposition, and so be contradictory in Hegel’s sense. 
Kant, however, does not show how these contradictory categories can be reconciled and 
thought together as one, either in relation to that illusory world or (as in Hegel’s Logic) in 
themselves. Hegel’s assertion that Kant turns the conflict “into something subjective”, but 
otherwise leaves it “unresolved”, is thus justified, even though — pace Hegel — the 
unresolved conflict or contradiction attaches not to the realm of appearance (Erscheinung) 
but to the illusion (Schein) projected by reason (see SL 191 / LS 200).    
Kant’s second failure is different. As just noted, no contradictions are to be found in the 
sphere of appearance, as Kant understands it (since the latter is a not a given totality that must 
be, and yet cannot be, both infinite and finite). This conception of appearance as a 
contradiction-free zone does not, however, resolve the contradiction between the categories 
of infinity and finitude that Hegel finds expressed in Kant’s antinomies. It just removes the 
contradiction by denying that the categories are opposed-but-inseparable (since, in the sphere 
of appearances, they do not both apply to the same totality). Infinity and finitude are thereby 
simply left distinct from one another within appearance: finite things are, indeed, infinitely 
divisible, but they are thus “finite” and “infinite” in quite different respects. Now, for Kant, 
of course, finding a way to remove a contradiction is a mark of philosophical success; for 
Hegel, however, it is to fail to take seriously the insight implicitly contained in the 
antinomies. To take the latter seriously, in Hegel’s view, is not to do away with the 
contradictions within and between categories, but to think those contradictions through to 
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their logical conclusion and speculative resolution. Kant fails to do this because he does not 
see the need for a purely logical study of the categories in Hegel’s sense (see CPR B 108), 
but also because, for all his strengths, he is ultimately a philosopher of the understanding: in 
Kant’s view, the point of philosophy is not to go along with, and think through, contradiction 
but above all to keep thought and reality free of it.  
I have suggested that Hegel’s general interpretation and critique of Kant’s treatment of 
the antinomies are justified by certain key aspects of Kant’s procedure in the first Critique. 
Yet that interpretation and critique still do not look genuinely immanent, despite Hegel’s 
stated commitment to entering immanently into “the strength [Kraft] of the opponent” (SL 
581 / LB 10, trans. altered). First, Hegel focuses, not on what explicitly concerns Kant in the 
antinomies, but on what he takes to be implicit in Kant’s account of them: namely that 
categories themselves generate the antinomies. Second, Hegel takes Kant to task for failing to 
do what Kant had no intention of doing, namely consider the categories and their intrinsic 
antinomies “purely for themselves”, as Hegel himself does in his speculative logic.  
In another sense, however, Hegel’s critique of Kant on the basis of his logic can be 
considered immanent after all. This is because that very logic is made necessary by Kant’s 
own demand that thought be self-critical and not take the dogmatic assumptions of reason for 
granted. Dogmatism, Kant tells us, is the “presumption” (Anmaßung) that reason can proceed 
according to principles “without first inquiring in what way and by what right it has obtained 
them” (CPR B xxxv). The purpose of critique is thus to challenge that presumption and to 
show how — under what conditions — reason’s principles can be justified. Hegel, however, 
also sees in this conception of critique a call to challenge the unquestioned assumptions made 
by understanding, such as that distinct categories and concepts like “infinity” and “finitude” 
are, indeed, simply distinct and that thought and the world are governed by the principle of 
contradiction (or, more accurately, non-contradiction) (see SL 41–2 / LS 21–2, and EL §§ 32, 
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80). Hegel takes Kant to task, therefore, for failing to carry his own rejection of dogmatism to 
its logical conclusion: for Kant retains the categorial and conceptual distinctions of the 
understanding “without first inquiring in what way and by what right he has obtained 
them”.47 In Hegel’s eyes, to carry Kant’s rejection of dogmatism to its logical conclusion is to 
carry out the radically presuppositionless derivation and examination of the categories that is 
undertaken in the Science of Logic. That in turn includes a close study of those categories — 
such as infinity and finitude, condition and the unconditioned, and discreteness and continuity 
— that explicitly or implicitly “constitute the essence and ground of the antinomies” (SL 191 
/ LS 199). Hegel’s apparently “external” consideration of Kant’s antinomies is thus in fact 
guided by a logic that is the direct result of following Kant’s own injunction to reject 
dogmatism (as well as the indirect result of those antinomies themselves, as I noted above).  
 Hegel certainly does not do justice to Kant’s account of the antinomies in the way that 
Kantians may expect. Nonetheless, he offers a critique of Kant’s account (as well as of his 
transcendental idealism) that is ultimately driven by one of Kant’s own philosophical 
imperatives: anti-dogmatism. Hegel interprets Kant’s antinomies as imperfect anticipations of 
his own insight into the presuppositionless, immanent dialectic within thought through which 
contradictions in and between categories arise and are then resolved. From Hegel’s point of 
view, however, (as Gueroult puts it) “pressing the Kantian system is enough to let Hegelian 
dialectic emerge from it as if by itself”.48 
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1 See also SL 46 / LS 28–9; EL § 48 Add.  
2 See also EL § 28 and Remark. 
3 The German text reads: “Widersprüche, auf welche die Vernunft notwendig stoßen (nach Kantischem 
Ausdrucke) müsse”.  See CPR B 449 (though Hegel does not reproduce Kant’s wording exactly). On SL 46 / LS 
29 Hegel speaks of the “mistake of thinking”, or “misunderstanding”, (Mißverstand) that reason is “in 
contradiction with itself”, but on SL 191 / LS 199 he affirms the “antinomial” nature of reason. 
4 See Houlgate (2006), pp. 29–53. 
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5 For Hegel’s use of the term “presuppositionless”, or rather “presuppositionlessness” (Voraussetzungslosigkeit), 
see EL § 78 Remark. 
6 See EL §§ 46 Remark, 48 Remark; SL 56 / LS 41. Gueroult (1978, pp. 282–3) appears to miss the fact that 
Hegel saw this. 
7 See SL 191 / LS 199; EL § 41. See also Düsing (2004), p. 55, and Sedgwick (2012), p. 173.  
8 See also Gueroult (1978), p. 272. 
9 Throughout this essay I have replaced Miller’s “Notion” with “concept” as the translation of “Begriff”.  
10 See also Houlgate (2006), pp. 423–7. 
11 See also EL § 48 and Remark, and Düsing, p. 41. 
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 Other influences on Hegel include, of course, Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz and Schelling, but they do not 
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influences pushing Hegel towards presuppositionlessness include Descartes, Fichte and modern freedom more 
generally in the moral, political and religious spheres; see Houlgate (2006), pp. 23–71.  
19 See also Llewelyn (1987), p. 100. 
20 Hegel distinguishes between determinations of being and of reflection, but thinks of both as categories; see 
SL 409 / LW 25, and EL § 114 Remark.  
21 For Hegel, contradiction as such can also expressed as the “law” that states “all things are in themselves 
contradictory” (SL 439 / LW 59, trans. altered). 
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